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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM LEGISLATION IN THE 2013 VIRGINIA 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
* Ellis M. West 
If there is any Virginia law that deserves to be called "iconic," it is 
Section 16 of the Virginia Bill of Rights, which combines the religious 
freedom provision in Virginia's first Declaration of Rights ( 1776) with 
portions of Thomas Jefferson's Statute for Religious Liberty (1785) .1 These 
two documents also inspired the religion clauses of the First Amendment2 
and are world famous. 
Some of Section Sixteen's more important provisions are as follows: 
[A]ll men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the 
dictates of conscience; .... No man shall be compelled to frequent or support 
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall ... suffer on 
account of his religious opinions or belief; but all men shall be free to profess 
and by argument to maintain their opinions in matters of religion, and the same 
shall in nowise diminish, enlarge, or affect 
their civil capacities. And the General Assembly shall not .. 3 confer any peculiar privileges or advantages on any sect or denomination .... 
In other words, Section 16 guarantees both free exercise of religion and 
no establishment of religion in the Commonwealth. More precisely, it 
ensures the free exercise of religion by prohibiting the government from 
"meddling" in matters of religion. It reflects James Madison's position that 
government should take no "cognizance" of religion,4 and it has served 
Virginia well for more than two centuries. 
Ellis West, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, University of Richmond, and author of The 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Guarantees of States' Rights? (2011). 
1 Compare VA. CONST. art. I,§ 16, with The Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776) reprinted in THE 
GEORGE MASON LECTURES 20, 20-21 (1976), and VA. CODE ANN.§ 57-1 (1950). 
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "). 
3 VA. CONST. art. 1, § 16. 
4 See JAMES MADISON, To THE HONORABLE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA. A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE (1785), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTION & RELIGION: 
LEADING SUPREME COURT CASES ON CHURCH AND STATE 29, 30 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1999) ("We 
1 
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Apparently, however, some Virginians and their legislators believe that 
Section 16 does not adequately protect religious liberty, because a bill -
Senate Joint Resolution 287 - that would add a paragraph to Section 16 
was introduced in the 2013 session of the Virginia General Assembly. 5 Co-
sponsored by Senator William M. Stanley, Jr., Republican, from Moneta; 
by Senator Charles W. Carrico, Sr., Republican, from Galax; and Delegate 
Mark L. Cole, Republican, from Fredericksburg,6 Senate Joint Resolution 
287 was approved by the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections. 
The vote was entirely along party lines: Republicans voted for and 
Democrats voted against the measure. 7 (This raises the question: since 
when and for what reason did protection of religious liberty become a 
partisan matter?) The proposed amendment was not able to garner enough 
votes to pass the Senate, but it was remanded to committee, where it will be 
considered again next year. 8 Its patron, Senator Stanley, has stated that he 
will vigorously champion the measure again next year.9 His efforts should 
not be taken lightly: in August 2012, Missouri added an almost identically 
worded amendment to its constitution. 10 That fact suggests either that 
Senator Stanley simply copied the Missouri law or that there is a concerted, 
organized effort to get such an amendment added to the constitutions of 
various states. 
Intended primarily to prevent the Commonwealth from suppressing the 
religious expression of any person, including students, elected officials, and 
state employees, 11 the proposed amendment is so long, with nine 
provisions, that if it were adopted, it would dwarf and detract from 
Virginia's historic Section 16. It is also redundant, confusing, and raises as 
many questions about its meaning as it answers. These features by 
maintain ... that in matters of Religion. no man's right is abridged by the institntion of Civil Society, 
and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance."); see also Vincent Phillip Munoz, James 
Madison's Principles of Religious Liberty, 97 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 17, 17 (2003) (discussing Madison's 
principle of "non-cognizance"). 
5 S.J. Res. 287, 2013 Va. Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013) (as introduced Jan. 9, 2013). 
6 Id. 
7 Jim Nolan, Electoral Vote Change Shelved; Prayer Amendment Backed, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, 
Jan. 30, 2013, http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/latest-news/electoral-vote-change-shelved-prayer-
amendment-backed/article_0945ff50-6aef-11e2-b14e-OO l 9bb30f31 a.html. 
8 See K.A. Wagoner, Prayer Protection Amendment Stalls for Now, FRANKLIN NEWS-POST, Feb. 8, 
2013, http://www.thefranklinnewspost.com/article.cfm ?ID=24132. 
9 Id. 
lO Mo. CONST. art, 1. § 5; see also Kellie Kotraba, Missouri Prayer Amendment Passes, USA TODAY 
(Aug. 8, 2012, 5:08 PM) http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/story/2012-08-08/missouri-
prayer-amendment/56882182/l (last visited April 21, 2013). 
11 See S.J. Res. 287, 2013 Va. Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013) (containing provisions affecting 
students, elected officials, and state employees). 
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themselves would be a sufficient reason to reject it. Nevertheless, Senate
Joint Resolution 287 does attempt to address some legitimate concerns and
its supporters might choose to rewrite it in such a way as to make it
reasonably clear and concise. For those reasons, it deserves a careful and
extended analysis.
This article consists of the following sections: Section one presents the
content of the proposed amendment and explains the ways in which it is
unclear, redundant, and otherwise poorly written. Section two addresses the
issue of whether the provisions intended to protect religious expression,
including prayer, are necessary and can solve the problems they are
intended to solve. It also identifies the crucial challenge in cases involving
religious expression - namely, determining correctly whether it is the
government or a private individual or group that is expressing or promoting
a religious belief or practice. This determination must be made because
religious expression or advocacy by the government, but not by private
individuals or groups, is prohibited by the First Amendment and Section 16
of the Virginia Bill of Rights. Section three examines whether Senate Joint
Resolution 287 represents an attempt to challenge and change the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation of the religion clauses. It focuses in
particular on a provision that seeks to authorize prayers before or during
meetings of legislative bodies, such as county boards of supervisors.
Section four discusses the necessity for and the constitutionality of one of
the provisions in the proposed amendment that is unrelated to religious
expression, namely, one that exempts students from having to participate in
academic work to which they have religious objections. The fifth and final
section concludes that Senate Joint Resolution 287, even if written well,
should be rejected because most of its provisions are unnecessary and some
are either unconstitutional or will encourage state agencies, officials, or
employees to take actions that will be declared unconstitutional by federal
or state courts.
I. THE CONTENT AND MEANING OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 287.
Five of Senate Joint Resolution 287's provisions have the purpose of
allowing or enabling certain kinds of religious expressions, including prayer
12
said aloud. Provision two (but the first one relating to the protection of
such expression) requires the Commonwealth to "accommodate the right of
any person to pray individually or corporately on public property so long as
such prayer does not result in disturbance of the peace or disruption of a
12 S.J. Res. 287, 2013 Va. Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013) (as proposed Jan. 29, 2013 by the Senate
Committee on Privileges and Elections).
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public meeting or assembly or other public business."13 Provision three
gives "citizens as well as elected officials and employees of the
Commonwealth and its political subdivisions . . . the right to pray on
government premises and public property so long as such prayers abide
within the same parameters placed upon any other free speech under similar
circumstances." Provision four allows "the General Assembly and the
governing bodies of political subdivisions" to "extend to ministers,
clergypersons, and other individuals the privilege to offer invocations or
other prayers" at the meetings of their organizations.15 Provision five
allows "students in public schools" to "express their beliefs about religion
in written and oral assignments free from discrimination based on the
religious content of their work." Finally, provision seven (the fifth and
final one relating to the protection of religious expression) requires the
Commonwealth to "ensure public school students their right to free exercise
of religious expression without interference, as long as such prayer or other
expression is private and voluntary, whether individually or corporately,
and in a manner that is not disruptive and as long as such prayers or
expressions abide within the same parameters placed upon any other free
speech under similar circumstances." 17
Although most of the provisions quoted above limit the extent of the
protection they afford to religious expression, Senate Joint Resolution 287
contains an additional, separate limitation on such expression. The last
substantive provision in the document says that "this section shall not be
construed to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent
with the good order, peace, or safety of the Commonwealth or with the
rights of others."
Two of Senate Joint Resolution 287's provisions prohibit the
Commonwealth from requiring certain kinds of expression or activity. The
very first provision of the Amendment states that "the Commonwealth shall
not coerce any person to participate in any prayer or other religious
activity." Provision six says that "no student in public schools shall be
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
1 Id.
Id.
19 Id.
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compelled to perform or participate in academic assignments or educational
presentations that violate his religious beliefs."20
The remaining provision, the eighth one, requires "all free public schools
receiving state appropriations" to "display, in a conspicuous and legible
manner, the text of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United
States." The one thing that all the provisions have in common is that they
refer to an activity that takes place on public property.
What is one to make of this proposed amendment to Section 16? This is
an especially appropriate question to ask because the bill is so poorly
drafted. In addition to containing specific writing errors,22 it is redundant
and possibly inconsistent in some ways. The most obvious redundancy
results from having provisions two, three, and possibly seven, depending on
how they are interpreted. Two and three both attempt to protect prayer, but
two refers to the prayers of "any person," whereas three refers to the
prayers of "citizens as well as elected officials and employees of the
Commonwealth."23 Because "any person" includes a citizen, elected
official, and state employee, why have a separate provision covering the
latter persons? Even if the intention was to make sure that the latter persons
are covered, that could easily be done by combining the two provisions. Of
course, the two provisions state different limitations on the protection
24
afforded prayer, but surely the drafter(s) of these provisions did not intend
for the prayers of persons on the one hand and those of citizens, elected
officials, and state employees on the other hand to be protected in different
degrees. If both of the stated limitations should apply to all the above
categories of persons, then they should be combined in one provision
applying to all those persons.
Given provision two, provision seven is also unnecessary. Although it
refers to "public school students,"25 they are obviously "persons" covered
in provision two. Again, even if the intention was to make sure that students
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 For example, the second provision refers to "any person" praying "individually or corporately." The
third one refers to "citizens as well as elected officials and employees" as if the latter were not citizens.
Provision six refers to "his", instead of his/her, religious beliefs. Sometimes the document says "so long
as"; other times it says "as long as." Provision seven refers to "such prayer", but there is no prayer
referred to earlier in the provision see id..
23 S.J. Res. 287, 2013 Va. Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013) (as proposed Jan. 29, 2013 by the Senate
Committee on Privileges and Elections).
24 The limitation in provision two is that the protected prayer should "not result in disturbance of the
peace or disruption of a public meeting or assembly or other public business," whereas the limitation in
provision three is that the prayer should "abide within the same parameters placed upon any other free
speech under similar circumstances." Id.
25 Id.
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are protected by the proposed amendment, that could easily be done in one
provision by mentioning them along with citizens, elected officials, and
government employees. There is, of course, a difference between what is
protected in provision two and in provision seven. The former protects only
prayer, whereas the latter protects "religious expression," including
prayer. Was this difference intended or simply the result of oversight?
Most persons would assume that it is the latter, because there is no reason
to limit what is protected in provisions two and three (applicable to persons,
citizens, etc.) to prayer as opposed to religious expression in general and yet
in provision seven (applicable to students) to protect all kinds of religious
expression and not just prayer. Why not in one grovision protect the
religious expression, including prayer, of all persons?
As for inconsistencies, there are at least two worth noting. The first is in
the way religious expression can be limited by the Commonwealth.
Provision two says that prayer can be prohibited if it results "in disturbance
of the peace or disruption of a public meeting or assembly or other public
business." 28 The third provision says that prayer can be limited by "the
same parameters placed upon any other free speech under similar
,29
circumstances." Are these two limitations intended to be two different
ways of saying the same thing? If so, the intention is wrong, because speech
or expression in general can be limited for reasons other than the fact that it
is likely to disturb the peace or disrupt a public meeting or public
business.30 This raises the question as to whether Senate Joint Resolution
287 is intended to provide more protection for (impose fewer limitations
on) religious expression than is provided for other kinds of expression.
Complicating matters even more are two other provisions. Provision
seven protects religious expressions only if they are "not disruptive" (of
what?) and if they "abide within the same parameters placed upon any other
free speech under similar circumstances. Then provision nine states that
26 Id.
27 There are other minor redundancies: Provision two refers to both "meeting or assembly." Provision
three refers to both "government premises and public property." That this is a redundancy is suggested
by the fact that provision two refers only to public property. Provision four refers to "ministers,
clergypersons, and other individuals," to "invocations or other prayers", and to "meetings or sessions."
In the last provision, there is no need to have both "excuse acts" and "justify practices." See id.
28 S.J. Res. 287, 2013 Va. Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013) (as introduced Jan. 29, 2013 by the
Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections).
29 Id.
30 See text accompanying notes 81-85, infra; Henry Cohen, Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to
the First Amendment, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, at 1, available at http://www.fas.o-
rg/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf.
31 S.J. Res. 287, 2013 Va. Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013) (as introduced Jan. 29, 2013 by the
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM LEGISLATION
the document "shall not be construed to excuse acts of licentiousness or
justify practices inconsistent with the good order, peace, or safety of the
Commonwealth or with the rights of others."32 It is not clear, however,
whether the "acts" and "practices" refer to expressions themselves, to the
effects of the expressions, or to both, nor is it clear what is meant by the
"rights of others." Regardless of how these questions are answered, the
limitation in this provision is much broader than the limitations in
provisions two, three, and seven, so much so that it would allow religious
expression to be curtailed much more, not less, than other kinds of
expression can be curtailed. If this is what provision nine means, if
challenged in court, it is very likely to be struck down. The Supreme Court
has never said that expressions can be prohibited or restricted on the
grounds that they either are or cause "acts of licentiousness" or "practices
inconsistent with the good order, peace, or safety of the Commonwealth or
with the rights of others." This is simply too vague a criterion for
determining when expression can be prohibited or regulated.33
A second area of inconsistency relates to what the Commonwealth must
do or not do with respect to religious expression. Provision three says that
certain persons have the "right" to pray, which implies that the
Commonwealth has a duty simply to allow them to pray or not prevent
them from praying. Provision two requires the Commonwealth to
"accommodate" the right of persons to pray. Does "accommodate" here
mean the same as "allow," or does it require the Commonwealth to do more
than just "allow" prayer?34  Then provision seven requires the
Commonwealth to "ensure public school students their right to free exercise
of religious expression without interference."35 Does "ensure" mean
something other than what "allow" or "accommodate" means? Are
provisions two and/or seven intended to require the public schools to
organize or arrange for occasions when or places where students can pray
or otherwise express their faith?
Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections).
32 Id.
33 It is not clear that the Court has ever enunciated a general criterion to distinguish between protected
and unprotected speech. For some categorical exclusions, see, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942) ("[I]t has been well observed that [the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or 'fighting' words] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to the truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.").
34 S.J. Res. 287, 2013 Va. Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013) (as introduced Jan. 29, 2013 by the
Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections); WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 49
(Merriam-Webster Inc., 9th ed. 1983) (defining "accommodate" as "3: to provide with something
desired, needed, or suited (as a helpful service, a loan, or lodgings)").
35 S.J. Res. 287, 2013 Va. Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013) (as introduced Jan. 29, 2013 by the
Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections).
2013] 7
8 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVII:i
Finally, the meaning of some other words and phrases in Senate Joint
Resolution 287 is unclear. Provision four states that "governing bodies of
. . . -36political subdivisions" may invite ministers to pray at their meetings.
What is meant by "governing bodies?" Presumably this refers only to
legislative bodies like city councils and county boards of supervisors, and
not to other government agencies; if it means the latter, then the provision
would apply only to agencies of "political subdivisions" and not to state
agencies. There is no logical reason for making such a distinction.
Provision seven, which ensures the right of public school students to
personal religious expression, is conditioned on the expression being
"private." Does this mean that no one else besides the students doing the
expressing should hear the expression, or that the expression must not be
written, sponsored, promoted, etc., by the school or any of its employees?
Hopefully, it means the latter. Finally, provision eight says that "all free
public schools receiving state appropriations"38 must display the Bill of
Rights. This implies that some public schools are not "free" and do not
"receive state appropriations." Is this true? Even if it is, why should such
schools not be required to display the Bill of Rights?
In short, Senate Joint Resolution 287 is not well written. A teacher of
English composition might label it "a first draft." That an almost identical
provision was added to the Missouri Constitution in 201239 does not change
that fact, but reflects poorly on the legislators and voters of that state. On
the other hand, if a good case could be made for adding something like the
proposed amendment to the Virginia Bill of Rights, then perhaps there is no
need to be overly concerned about how well it is currently written. After all,
it could be rewritten at next year's Virginia General Assembly. Can,
however, a good case be made for Senate Joint Resolution 287?
II. IS SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 287 NECESSARY OR USEFUL?
The sponsors and proponents of Senate Joint Resolution 287 apparently
believe that religious expression is not adequately protected in Virginia.
More specifically, they assume that the protections for religious expression
mandated by the bill do not already exist and that, as a result, the
Commonwealth is discriminating against religious expression to a
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 MO. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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significant extent. Here is Senator Stanley's explanation of why his
proposed constitutional amendment is needed:
Over the years, our right to worship has been under constant attack by various
organizations . . . . Additionally, the doctrine of separation of church and state
has been misconstrued by the courts and the government . . ., which has
steadily removed God from the public forum, contributing to the moral decay
of this country. We must reverse these trends. Religious freedom does not
constitute freedom to worship just on Sunday, bjt also includes the freedom to
express one's faith publicly as he or she sees fit.
This explanation is to be expected. Various persons and groups within
the Religious Right have alleged for several years now that freedom of
religion and religious expression are under attack by anti-religious persons
and groups. According to these parties, these rights are often far too limited
by state and local governments, especially schools and courts. A common
complaint is that religious expression has been removed from the "public
,,41
square.
With one possible exception, however, most of the religious expressions
Senate Joint Resolution 287 would protect are already under protection
through other laws. The Supreme Court, on the basis of the First
42 43Amendment or the Equal Access Act, a federal statute, has consistently
held that religious expression, including prayers said aloud, must be
protected just as much as other kinds of expression-provided the
expression is not coerced, sponsored, promoted, or endorsed by any agency
or person acting on behalf of the government.4 4 For example, the Court has
held that if a public university allows secular groups to meet in its rooms, it
cannot prohibit religious groups from meeting in its rooms, even if their
meetings involve worship; that if a public university funds different kinds
40 Wagoner, supra note 8.
41 See MARK A. BELILES & STEPHEN K. MCDOWELL, AMERICA'S PROVIDENTIAL HISTORY 179-84
(Providence Found., 3d ed. 2010); DAVID C. GIBBS, JR., ONE NATION UNDER GOD: TEN THINGS EVERY
CHRISTIAN SHOULD KNow ABOUT THE FOUNDING OF AMERICA 19, 50, 69, 79, 155 (Christian Law
Assoc., 2d ed. 2005); Liberty Inst., The Survey of Religious Hostility in America, LIBERTY INST. (2012),
www.religioushostility.org (portraying Liberty Institute's explicit dedication to restoring "religious
liberty in America.") (emphasis added).
42 U.S. CONST. amend. I (mandating "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion] . . ., or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .").
43 20 U.S.C. §4071(a) (2006) (making it "unlawful for any public secondary school which receives
Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair
opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited
open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such
meetings.").
44 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) ("Our precedent
establishes that private religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected
under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression.") (emphasis added).
45 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981).
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of student publications, it cannot exclude religious publications from
46
receiving that funding; that if a public school allows secular organizations
to use its facilities after school hours, it cannot prevent religiously-oriented
organizations from also using them;47 and that a group cannot be prevented
from erecting a cross for a limited time on the grounds around a state
capitol if other groups can use it for public speeches, gatherings, and
displays.48
In all these Supreme Court cases, the government involved argued that if
it were to aid the religious groups and their expressive activities, even if it
were no more than the aid given to secular groups/activities, it would
violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment.49 The Court,
however, rejected that argument and held that the establishment clause
could not be used to justify government discrimination against
nongovernmental religious expression. 50
Especially noteworthy is the amount of protection given to the religious
expression of students in public schools, even though it is not as much as
that given to the religious expression of persons outside the school
environment.51 The leading Supreme Court decision on students' freedom
of expression is Tinker v. Des Moines School District, which held that
student expression, even if it leads to "controversy," may not be prohibited
unless it can be shown that it would "materially and substantially" disrupt
the work of the school, cause disorder, or invade the rights of other
students.53 Later decisions added that the expression may be prohibited if it
54is vulgar, lewd or offensive or can be reasonably viewed as promoting an
illegal act.55
On the basis of these precedents, lower federal courts have held that,
absent the conditions for limiting their expression, students may wear
46 Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831-37 (1995).
47 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993); Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 110 (2001).
48 Pinette, 515 U.S. at 762.
49 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395; Good
News Club, 533 U.S. at 112; Pinette, 515 U.S. at 762.
50 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845; Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S. at 394-95; Good
News Club, 533 U.S. at 112; Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763.
51 Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students' Religious Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination, 110
W.VA. L. REV. 187, 190-91, 219 (2007).
52 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
53 Id. at 509-10, 513.
54 Bethel County Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
55 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,403 (2007).
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56
rosaries and other religious jewelry and outside of classrooms may
57distribute candy canes with religious messages. Most lower courts have
even held that religion-based messages on t-shirts that condemn
homosexuality, abortion, and the Muslim religion may not be prohibited,
even when some of these messages could be said to violate the rights of
others. 58 In addition, one federal court has stated that "[i]ndividual student
expression that articulates a particular [religious] view but that comes in
response to a class assignment or activity would appear to be protected." 59
In all the cases referenced so far in this section, the issue of whether the
religious expression could be prohibited arose only because the expression
took place in or on government property, e.g., public schools. When
religious expression is completely unrelated to government property,
programs, or funding, restrictions on it because of its content are seldom, if
ever, attempted. Moreover, given the absence of government involvement,
the times when and places where religious and other kinds of expression
can occur without its content's being restricted are so numerous as to be
almost unlimited. No attempt, therefore, will be made here to list all of
them. Some examples should suffice: door-to-door evangelism;
presentation of religious ideas in books, magazines, newspapers,
radio/television, and the internet; religious messages on church or
residential property; and the display of religious messages and symbols in
stores and businesses.
In addition, contrary to what is often alleged, the Supreme Court has
never said that the establishment clause or the principle of separation of
56 Chalifoux v. New Cany Ind. Sch. Dist., 976 F.Supp. 659, 667 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
57 Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D. Mass.2003). In
another, but unnamed case, a federal court recently held that if fifth-graders can hand out invitations to
birthday and Valentines Parties and to off-school events sponsored by secular organizations, they have a
right to hand out invitations to a Christmas party at a church. "US appeals court OKs church invites at
Pa. school," posted by Associated Press, March 14, 2013.
58 Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 204, 636 F.3d 874, 875, 879-80 (7th Cir. 2011) (allowing "Be
Happy, Not Gay," but implying that "homosexuals go to Hell" could be prohibited as "fighting words");
Nixon v. Northern Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F.Supp.2d 965, 971 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (allowing
"Homosexuality is a sin!/Islam is a lie!/Abortion is murder!/Some issues are just black and white!");
K.D. ex rel. Dibble v. Fillmore Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 05-CV-0336(E), 2005 WL 2175166, at *7
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005) (allowing "ABORTION IS HOMICIDE," "You will not mock my God," and
"Rock for Life!"); Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2001)
(finding that the school could not prohibit saying that homosexuality is a sin on grounds that it
constitutes harassment); Chambers v. Babbitt, 145 F. Supp.2d 1068, 1074 (D. Minn.2001) (finding that
prohibition of "Straight Pride" sweatshirt as offensive was an actionable First Amendment violation).
Compare Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th. Cir. 2006), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007) ("BE
ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED. HOMOSEXUALITY
IS SHAMEFUL" not allowed on grounds it violates rights of gays).
59 Walz v. Egg Harbor Township Board of Education, 342 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2003).
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church and state prevents religious individuals and organizations from
participating in public discussions of issues pertaining to our political and
civic life. In fact, it has said, "Adherents of particular faiths and individual
churches" have just as much a right to "take strong positions on public
issues" as secular persons and bodies do.60 The Court also has not said that
publicly expressed positions of religious organizations on issues of public
policy cannot be based on or justified by religious beliefs or authorities,
such as the Bible. In fact, it has said, "[t]hat the Judeo-Christian religions
oppose stealing does not mean that [the government] . . . may not,
consistent with the Establishment Clause, enact laws prohibiting larceny."61
There is one simple and obvious reason for these facts: the First
Amendment limits only what the overnment ("Congress" and, because of
the Fourteenth Amendment, states ) may do. It does not limit what private
individuals/groups may do.
On the other hand, because of the Internal Revenue Code and not the
establishment clause, churches and other religious organizations that wish
to be classified as tax-exempt and to have donations to them be tax-
deductible to the donor must abide by two limitations. They must not
engage in campaigning for or against candidates for elective office, and
they must not devote a "substantial" part of their work to influencing law-
63
making (lobbying). If they do, then the revocation of their tax-exempt
64
status does not violate their freedom of religion or expression. These
limitations, however, apply not just to religious organizations but to all non-
60 Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). Also see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976)("[R]egulation of communication may not be affected by sympathy or hostility
for the point of view being expressed by the communicator."), Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414
(1989)("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable."), and Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
61 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980); see also Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 379 (8th Cir.
1989) ("We ... find no support for the proposition that a rule, which otherwise conforms with Lemon,
becomes unconstitutional due only to its harmony with the religious preferences of constituents . .. We
simply do not believe elected government officials are required to check at the door whatever religious
background (or lack of it) they carry with them before they act on rules that are otherwise
unobjectionable . . . ."); cf. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 566-67 (1989) (J.
Stevens, dissenting) (arguing that legislative declarations that life begins at conception are suspect as in
line with some Christian beliefs and no secular purposes).
62 U.S. CONST. amend I; U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § .
63 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 170(a) (2013). The Internal
Revenue Service has not defined "substantial," but tax experts have said that "lobbying activities that
exceed the roughly 16 to 20 percent range of total activities . . . are generally considered substantial."
For example see Judith E. Kindell & John F. Reilly, P. Lobbying Issues, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TEXT, 1997, at 280.
64 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1982); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211
F.3d 137, 142 (D. C. Cir. 2000).
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profit organizations that wish to be tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code, and an organization can always avoid both
limitations by giving up its tax-exempt status and can avoid the limitation
on lobbying by creating under § 501(c)(4) a separate but affiliated lobbying
organization, contributions to which could not be tax-deductible.
Moreover, these restrictions do not apply to leaders of churches or religious
organizations when they are speaking for themselves as individuals, nor do
they prevent religious organizations from discussing issues and problems of
public importance, even during political campaigns.
Although this is not the time or place to explain fully how the Supreme
Court now interprets the free speech and press clauses, the decisions
protecting religious expressions cited above were based on what most
scholars consider to be the bedrock principle of those clauses, namely, that
the government may not suppress a particular expression or communication
67because of the idea or viewpoint it contains. Stated positively, the First
Amendment requires the government to maintain neutrality toward
viewpoints expressed by private persons and groups. Thus, the Court has
held that "government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."68 Even categories of
expression that can constitutionally be banned entirely, such as fighting
words, may not be selectively banned on the basis of viewpoint. Thus, all
fighting words must be outlawed, or else none.69 It is because of the
principle of viewpoint neutrality that the government cannot discriminate
against religious expression, i.e., prohibit (or allow) it when in the same
circumstances other kinds of expression are allowed (or not allowed), even
65 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); See also I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2012).
66 See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 699-704 (2nd ed. 2006),
for a discussion of whether these alternatives or exceptions adequately protect the freedom of churches
and other religious organizations.
67 See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 17 (1992).
68 Police Dep't of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See also Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976) ("[R]egulation of communication may not be affected by
sympathy or hostility for the point of view being expressed by the communicator."); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable."); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("At
the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself
the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and
cultural life rest on this ideal.").
69 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Min, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) ("The government may not regulate
[speech] based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed."). See also id.
at 383-84, 391-92.
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when the professed reason for such discrimination is that it is required by
the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 70
On the other hand, there is one major difference between the law relating
to religious expression and that relating to secular expression. Regarding
the latter, although the First Amendment's speech/press clauses have been
interpreted as prohibiting government from restricting private
(nongovernmental) expression on the basis of its viewpoint, they have not
been interpreted as prohibiting the government from expressing its own
ideas or views on secular issues.7 1 Thus, in public schools, the mass media,
and elsewhere, government may and does attempt to influence the secular
72beliefs of its citizens. In contrast, the religion clauses of the First
Amendment have been interpreted as prohibiting the government from
expressing its own ideas or views on religious issues or questions. The
fundamental goal of the religion clauses was to deprive the government of
all jurisdiction over religious matters.7 3 Government, therefore, may not
pass any law or take any other action whose primary purpose or effect is to
advance or harm religion in general, any particular religious belief or
practice, or any persons or groups because of their religious
beliefs/practices. It must "maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor
. . . ,74
opposing religion."
The Supreme Court has explained the difference between laws relating to
secular expressions/ideas and to religious expressions/ideas as follows:
70 One could, of course, challenge the decisions upholding this principle, cited in fns 47-52, on the
grounds that prohibiting religious groups from using public facilities because it is required by the
establishment clause is not the same as doing so because of hostility toward those religious groups and,
thus, does not violate the principle of viewpoint neutrality. This raises the question of whether in order
to be violated, the principle of viewpoint neutrality requires a finding of hostility, antagonism, or
opposition toward whatever expression is prohibited or requires only a finding of unequal treatment
which cannot be justified by some compelling state interest.
71 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005). See also Daniel W. Park, Government
Speech and the Public Forum: A Clash Between Democratic and Egalitarian Values, 45 GONZ. L. REV.
113, 145 (2009-10) ("The only clear limit on government speech is the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.")
72 See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) ("The importance of public schools in the
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which
our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions"); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 ("[Public
schools] must inculcate... fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic system.")
(internal citation omitted).
73 See ELLIS M. WEST, THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: GUARANTEES OF STATES'
RIGHTS? 75-76, 167, 183-84. (2011).
74 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); see also id. at 222; Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between
religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.").
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The First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite different
mechanisms. Speech is protected by insuring its full expression even when the
government participates, for the very object of some of our most important
speech is to persuade the government to adopt an idea as its own. The method
for protecting freedom of worship and freedom of conscience in religious
matters is quite the reverse. In religious debate or expression the government is
not a prime participant .... The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of
conscience and worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the
First Amendment, but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on
forms of state intervention in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the
speech provisions.
Moreover, the religion clauses deny the government jurisdiction over
religious affairs not because early Americans were hostile toward religion
or any particular religion, but because they wanted to protect religious
freedom and ultimately the religious experience itself. Most of them
believed that government involvement in religious matters necessarily
76
undermines or corrupts the integrity or authenticity of religion. They,
therefore, prohibited all laws "respecting an establishment of religion," that
is, laws that favor (or disfavor) certain religions or religious beliefs and
practices over others. Again, the Supreme Court has explained this point
well:
... [T]he Framers deemed religious establishment antithetical to the freedom
of all. . . . The explanation lies in the lesson of history that was and is the
inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the lesson that in the hands of
government what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may
end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce. A state-created orthodoxy puts at
grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance
that religious faith is real, not imposed.7 7
Nevertheless, even though the establishment clause prohibits the
government from expressing its opinion of religion in general, a particular
religion, or a particular religious belief or practice, that in no way negates
the fact that religious expression by private (nongovernmental) individuals
and groups is rigorously protected from government regulation by other
provisions in the First Amendment. As the Court has said, the crucial
distinction is between "government speech endorsing religion, which the
75 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
76 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962) ("The Establishment Clause thus stands as an
expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too
sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion'."); see, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), reprinted in RALPH KETCHAM, SELECTED
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 24 (2006) (". . . [E]xperience witnesseth that ecclesiastical
establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary
operation.").
7 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 591-92.
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Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which
the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."78 For this reason,
although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the matter, one justice noted
for his tenacity in upholding the establishment clause has said that it does
not prohibit public officials from delivering public speeches with religious
content, because "we recognize that their words are not exclusively a
transmission from the government because those oratories have embedded
within them the inherently personal view of the speaker as an individual
member of the polity." 79
This, of course, does not mean that freedom of expression, whether
religious or secular, is absolute or unlimited. Depending on their content,
time, place, and manner, expressions can be restricted by the government in
many ways. Certain kinds of expression, e.g., inciting and conspiring to
commit crimes including the overthrow of the government, fighting words,
obscenity, and defamation of private persons, are, according to the Supreme
Court, "beyond the pale," i.e., afforded almost no protection by the First
Amendment.80 Beyond these kinds of expressions, what the government
may prohibit or regulate depends on whether the expression takes place on
government property. If it does not, then whether the government may
prohibit an expression depends on whether it is because of the expression's
viewpoint (message) or because of its time, place, or manner (medium). A
regulation of expression on the basis of its viewpoint is permissible only if
the law can pass the "strict scrutiny test" - it can be justified by a
"compelling" state interest that is narrowly drawn to serve that end. In
contrast, a viewpoint neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of
expressions need be justified only by a "significant" governmental interest.
It must also leave open ample alternative ways of communicating the
regulated expression-a much easier test to pass.
When, however, expressions occur on government property or come
from government employees, then the First Amendment law becomes
somewhat more complicated and provides the expressions less protection.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (quoting Bd. of Ed. of Westside Cmty.
Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)).
79 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 723 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80 SUE DAVIS, CORWIN AND PELTASON'S UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 268-274 (Thomson
Wadsworth ed., 17th ed. 2008).
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990); lBd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews
for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1987)); see generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and
Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418-25 (1996).
82 DAVIs, supra note 81, at 276.
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After all, government property, generally speaking, "belongs" to the
government and like private property can be protected from others who
want to use it for their own purposes, which may conflict with those of the
government. Like private companies, the government also has work to do,
business to conduct, and laws to administer and enforce, and the First
Amendment does not require it to allow expression that interferes with its
83
effective functioning. Thus, although the Supreme Court has said that
public school students have some degree of freedom of expression, it added
that they cannot use that freedom if it "materially" and "substantially"
disrupts a school's educational program. 84 Similarly the expressions of
public employees made in pursuance of their professional duties, as
distinguished from their public statements made as citizens on matters of
public concern outside the scope of their official duties, are not protected by
the First Amendment.85 For this reason, public school teachers can be fired
if, in the classroom and against instructions, they offer their personal
opinion on a political issue. Finally, as noted above, the religion clauses
of the First Amendment prohibit speech by government employees that
either endorses or disparages religion in general, any particular religion, or
any religious belief/practice, when the speech would appear to a reasonable
observer to be government speech.8 7
On the other hand, on certain kinds of government property non-
governmental expression is not only allowed, but protected to a very high
degree. First, there is the "traditional public forum" or "open forum" -
government property, such as sidewalks, streets, courthouse squares, and
public parks, that has historically been used by persons/groups as places
88
where they could express their ideas. Viewpoint-based restrictions on
expressions in that forum are forbidden unless they can pass the strict
scrutiny test.89 The second kind of government property that might be open
83 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) ("Where the government is
acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than acting as a lawmaker with the power
to regulate or license, its actions will not be subjected to the heightened review to which its actions as a
lawmaker may be subject.").
84 Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09, 511, 513 (1969); see also Walz v. Egg
Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 277 78 (3d Cir. 2003) ("...[W]here an elementary school's
purpose in restricting student speech...is reasonably directed towards preserving its educational goals,
we will ordinarily defer to the school's judgment.").
85 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). See Lindsey v. City of Orrick, 491 F. 3d 892, 898 (8th
Cir. 2007), for an example of expression by a government employee that is protected by the First
Amendment.
86 Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he first amendment does
not entitle primary and secondary teachers, when conducting the education of captive audiences, to
cover topics, or advocate viewpoints, that depart from the curriculum adopted by the school system.").
87 See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
88 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
89 HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL 95-815, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS: EXCEPTIONS
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to private individuals/groups is called a "designated" or "limited" public
forum. This is property that the government uses to conduct its business,
but that it chooses to make available at certain times to private
individuals/groups as a place for them to express their ideas.90 When doing
this, however, it must not discriminate among such individuals or groups on
the basis of the views they express.91 On the other hand, the government
may limit the forum to certain groups, e.g., students,92 or to certain subjects,
e.g., items relevant to a school board meeting,93 provided the limits are not
viewpoint-based. Of course, reasonable time/place/manner restrictions in
these two kinds of forums are also permissible.
Although the preceding summary of the law dealing with freedom of
expression is incomplete and fails to discuss some of its complexities,
hopefully it suffices to show the extent to which religious expression by
private individuals/groups is already protected, not only in Virginia but the
nation as a whole. The main conclusion to be drawn from it is that religious
expression, provided a reasonable person would not attribute it to the
government, is protected as much as secular expression is protected. If that
is the case, then there is no need to amend Section Sixteen of the Virginia
Bill of Rights to protect religious expression.
Senator Stanley, Senate Joint Resolution 287's main patron, disagrees. In
his opinion, students, public officials, and state employees are too often
prevented from praying or expressing their religious beliefs even when they
are speaking for themselves and not the government. In a conversation with
the author, he cited a decision by high school authorities reprimanding a
football coach for participating in a team-initiated prayer before a game
even though all the coach did was to be near the team and bow his head.96
TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1, 34-35 (2009).
90 Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-47 (1983).
91 If the government, for example, charges a fee for the use of its property, it must charge the same fee
for religious and secular groups. Fairfax Covenant Church v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 17 F.3d 703, 706-
07 (4th Cir. 1994).
92 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267.
93 Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Pub. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 n.8 (1976).
94 See COHEN, supra note 90, at 16.
95 Interview with William Stanley, Senator, Virginia's 20th Senate District, in Richmond Va. (Jan. 23,
2013).
96 At our meeting, it was not clear to what incident Senator Stanley was referring. He may, however,
have been referring to one in Westmoreland, Tennessee, that occurred in the fall of 2011, when the
coaches of the football team bowed their heads during a team-led prayer, and later were reprimanded by
their superiors for having done so. When the school authorities were criticized by members of the
community for what they did, they defended their action on the grounds that the praying "can in no way
appear like it's endorsed by Summer County Schools personnel." See Josh Devine, Public School
Coaches Told not to Participate in Prayer, WSMV NEWS, Sept. 23, 2011, http://www.wsmv.com/st-
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Moreover, Stanley's concern is not necessarily or entirely unwarranted.
There have been times when students and state employees have been
prohibited from exercising or expressing their religious faith even though
many reasonable persons would not construe them as speaking for the
government.
Even if this is a problem to some degree, can a generally worded
constitutional provision or statute prevent these kinds of questionable
restrictions on religious expression? In other words, does it justify
amending Section 16 of the Virginia Bill of Rights? The answer to this
question depends on why unwarranted restrictions on religious expression
might sometimes be imposed by governments and upheld by the courts.
There are three explanations that deserve mentioning.
First, as Senator Stanley himself has noted,98 there are some
organizations in America today that appear to be opposed to any
manifestations or expressions of religion on government property or by
government employees and that aggressively respond to them by
threatening to sue the government agency that allows them. They engage in
what some might call "legal bullying." For the most part, these groups
believe that the establishment clause of the First Amendment requires as
much "separation of church and state" as possible. As a result, they reject
the Supreme Court's position that the religious speech of persons/groups
speaking only for themselves and not the government must be protected just
as much as their secular speech is. 99 Given the nature and commitment of
these organizations, however, it is hard to see how passing Senate Joint
Resolution 287 or any other such law would change their thinking or deter
them from attempting to remove religion "from the public square." So long
as they think that the First Amendment, which trumps any law that a state
ory/15538258/public-school-coaches-told-not-to-participate-in-prayer (stating that praying "can in no
way appear like it's endorsed by Sumner County Schools personnel"). For cases in which coaches were
prohibited from initiating, leading, and/or joining in team prayers, see Doe v. Duncanville School
District, 70 F.3d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 1995), and Borden v. School District of Township of East Brunswick,
523 F.3d 153, 174 (3d Cir. 2008).
97 See Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1059 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that a teacher was not
allowed to keep a Bible on his desk and read it while students were taking a test or engaged in other
silent activity); Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330, 1342 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that
students elected by their classmates to speak as they please at their graduation ceremony may not
include prayers or religious exhortation).
98 See Wagoner, supra note 8.
99 Perhaps the best known of these groups is the Freedom from Religion Foundation, an organization of
"freethinkers" (atheists, agnostics and skeptics) located in Madison, Wisconsin. FREEDOM FROM
RELIGION FOUND. (APRIL 12, 2013), http://ffrf.org/faq/item/14999-what-is-the-foundations-purpose?
(stating that its purpose is "to promote the constitutional principle of separation of church and state, and
to educate the public on matters relating to nontheism"). As its name implies, Americans United for
Separation of Church and State is another organization that continues to argue that the religion clauses
require as much separation of government and religion as possible.
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might pass, requires something like complete separation of church and
state, they will continue to challenge religious expressions that violate that
principle.
A second reason religious expression has sometimes been wrongly
denied is simply misunderstanding of the law on the part of government
officials, including school administrators and teachers. This problem, of
course, is perfectly understandable because First Amendment law is
complicated, to say the least, and has changed over time. The mass media is
especially to blame for this problem because it continues to say all too often
that the religion clauses of the First Amendment require "separation of
church and state,"100  even though those words are not in the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court long ago abandoned that language as
the best way of explaining the meaning of the religion clauses.101 Instead,
in 1963, it said that those clauses command "that the Government maintain
strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion."102 Today, it is still
the principle of neutrality, and not that of church-state separation, that the
Court uses to decide most cases arising under the religion clauses. Thus,
one scholar writes, ". . . [I]f there is a single premise that has animated the
Supreme Court's approach over the past fifty years-it would be the
neutrality principle. Government must be neutral toward religion, and
cannot endorse it over potential alternatives." 103
100 For example, the Public Broadcasting News Hour, in announcing that the Indiana Supreme Court
had upheld a voucher system for funding the education of students in the state, stated that the U.S.
Supreme Court had held that such a system does not violate the principle of "separation of church and
state"-thereby implying that the principle was mandated by the First Amendment and subscribed to by
the Court. PBS News Hour: Should Public Money be Used for Private Schools? (PBS television
broadcast, Apr. 1, 2013).
101 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). For at least three other reasons, "separation of
church and state" is a problematic term for explaining the meaning of the religion clauses: (1) The
clauses pertain to religion and not just churches. (2) "Separation" implies a two-way separation, but the
clauses require only a one-way separation; in other words, they require religion to be separate from
government, but not government to be separate from religion. (3) "Separation," especially "wall of
separation," implies that a complete separation of church (or religion) and state is required, but that is
simply not possible. A line, therefore, has to be drawn between what is and is not allowed, and
interpreting the religion clauses is essentially a matter of determining what or where that line is.
102 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); accord Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State
power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them."); see also Ellis M.
West, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES 549, 550 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006).
103 Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 972, 973 (2010); see also Andrew Koppelman, And I Don't Care What It Is: Religious
Neutrality in American Law, 39 PEPP. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1115, 1121 (2013); ANDREW
KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 1, 1-14 (2013).
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That persons generally and in government specifically do not understand
how the Supreme Court has interpreted the religion clauses of the First
Amendment is regrettable, but, again, this problem cannot be solved by the
Virginia General Assembly's passing another law. Even if Senate Joint
Resolution 287 made clear the extent to which religious expression is
already protected, which it does not, do that does not mean that it would be
read and understood by those persons in Virginia who need to do so. To
solve this problem of misunderstanding, the Commonwealth must educate
state employees in schools and other agencies about the basics of First
Amendment Law, including the rule that religious expression must be
protected no less than are other forms of expression. It should require them
to read one of several existing publications that do an excellent job of
explaining First Amendment law.
The third reason that religious expression is sometimes wrongly
suppressed, even by judges, is that it is often difficult to determine if a
particular expression is private (and allowed) or public (and not allowed).
Persons responsible for upholding the First Amendment must determine if a
particular expression is one that is encouraged, sponsored, or endorsed by
the government. Such a determination is often difficult to make, and even
judges may sometimes "get it wrong. Likewise, decisions by schools
administrators and judges about whether student's expressions, religious
and otherwise, are sufficiently disruptive or in violation of the rights of
others to be prohibited are very fact-specific, often difficult to make, and
"becoming notoriously unpredictable."1 06 Again, however, passing a
constitutional amendment or statute will not make these kinds of
determinations easier to make or prevent bad decisions from being made.
Making these kinds of decisions, and sometimes getting them wrong, is
inherent in the application of any law, especially one that is generally
worded.
1 See generally Ctr. for Religion and Public Affairs Wake Forest Univ. Sch. of Divinity, Religious
Expression in American Public Life: A Joint Statement of Current Law (Jan. 2010), available at
http://divinity.wfu.edu/religion-and-public-affairs/joint-statement; American Jewish Congress Religion
and the Public Schools: A Summary of the Law (Aug. 2009), available at
http://www.ajcongress.org/site/DocSer ver/2009 RPS -_August_09_Revision.pdf?doclD=3621;
Charles C. Haynes, A Teacher's Guide to Religion in the Public Schools in Finding Common Ground: A
First Amendment Guide to Religion and Public Schools, First Amendment Center (2007), available
at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/FCGcomplete.pdf.
105 In the Westmoreland, Tennessee, situation involving coaches bowing their heads, the spokesperson
for the Sumner County Schools was asked if "bowing one's head qualified as endorsing," and he
replied, "It depends on what it looks like. That's where you kind of get into the gray area that we're
having to deal with." See Devine, supra note 97.
106 Bowman, supra note 53, at 189, 204-05, 222.
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In summary, Senate Joint Resolution 287 is unnecessary because First
Amendment law already adequately protects religious expression, and
although that law is not always adhered to, adding an amendment to the
Virginia Bill of Rights will not solve that problem, because it is caused by
something other than the absence of a good law. The interpretation and
application of even the best of laws will always to some extent involve
disputes and mistakes.
III. IS SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 287 AN ATTEMPT TO CHALLENGE AND
CHANGE THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION
CLAUSES?
Given the conclusions reached above, namely, that Senate Joint
Resolution 287 is both unnecessary and unavailing, some persons might
reasonably suspect that its purpose is not to protect or increase the religious
freedom of private individuals or groups, but rather to allow religious
expression by the government itself, at least more so than the Supreme
Court currently allows. There are, moreover, three other aspects of the bill
that make such a suspicion fairly credible. 107
First, although Senate Joint Resolution 287 does not say that the
Commonwealth (or its agents) should be able to promote, encourage, or
endorse religious beliefs/practices of one sort or another, neither does it say
that it should not do so. It only says that the Commonwealth "shall not
coerce any person to participate in any prayer or other religious activity."10 8
If, however, it mentions one thing that the government may not do, why
does it not mention all the things it may not do? By not doing so, the bill
clearly implies that the Commonwealth may promote, encourage, or
endorse religion provided it does not use coercion. Of course, Senate Joint
Resolution 287 goes on to say that religious expression may be restricted
for other reasons, such as to avoid disturbing the peace or disrupting a
public meeting,109 but these kinds of restrictions apply to secular as well as
religious expressions. The Supreme Court, however, has said that in
addition to being restricted in these ways, religious expression by the
government is prohibited even if it does not entail any coercion. This was
one of the main points made in its opinion in School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp, which struck down school-sponsored prayer and
107 There is also the different wording of provisions two, three, and seven discussed earlier. See supra
text accompanying note 37.
108 S.J. Res. 287, 2013 Va. Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013).
109 Id.
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Bible-reading in the public schools even though it was alleged that students
were free not to participate in those religious exercises. In short, the
wording of Senate Joint Resolution 287 clearly suggests that one of its
intended purposes is to allow school-sponsored religious expression, such
as prayer and Bible reading, in the public schools of the Commonwealth.
A second reason for thinking that Senate Joint Resolution 287 is an
attempt to challenge and change the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
religion clauses is the phrase, "as long as such prayers or expressions abide
within the same parameters placed upon any other free speech under similar
circumstances," which (or a variant of it) appears twice in the bill-in the
third provision that gives citizens, elected officials, and state employees the
right to pray on government property and in the seventh provision that gives
111public school students the right to express their religion. In both cases,
the phrase appears to limit the religious expression allowed by the bill, but
only to the same extent and in the same way that secular expression is
already limited by the First Amendment as interpreted by the courts. It must
"abide within the same parameters placed upon any other free speech under
similar circumstances.' 12 At first glance, one might not construe this
language as allowing the government itself to engage in prayer or other
types of religious expression, but simply as granting the same protection to
religious expression by private individuals or groups that is provided to
their secular expression.
Such an interpretation, however, would be correct only as it pertains to
the religious expression of "citizens" and "public school students"-
nongovernmental actors. But what does the "same parameters" phrase mean
as applied to the prayers (and other religious expressions) of elected
officials and state employees? If by "elected officials and employees of the
Commonwealth"113 the bill is referring to such persons when they are not
speaking or praying on behalf of the government, as its representatives or
agents, then no problem is created by the "same parameters" phrase.
Unfortunately, Senate Joint Resolution 287 does not make it clear that when
it refers to "elected officials and employees of the Commonwealth," 114 it is
talking only about such persons when speaking or praying for themselves as
private individuals.
110 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (".. [A] violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion
while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended.").
ill S.J. Res. 287, 2013 Va. Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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This omission is unfortunate because if the bill is interpreted as referring
to public officials and state employees even when they are acting for or on
behalf of the government, then the "same parameters" phrase would indeed
be a way of allowing the government itself to promote a particular religion
through its prayers and other types of religious expression. How so? Recall
the major difference between the limits ("parameters") placed by the First
Amendment on government in relation to secular ideas and the limits
placed on it in relation to religious ideas. Although the government may
neither approve or disapprove of religious ideas ("viewpoints"), when it
comes to secular ideas the government is prevented only from prohibiting
them from being expressed. It is not prevented from endorsing and
promoting certain secular ideas, e.g., democracy, capitalism, equality, and
environmentalisn In short, Senate Joint Resolution 287's requirement
that prayers and other kinds of religious expression must "abide within the
same parameters placed upon any other free speech under similar
116
circumstances" would allow public officials and state employees to pray
and express certain religious viewpoints, even when a reasonable person
would think that they were acting as agents or on behalf of the government.
The reason: those parameters do not prevent them from favoring certain
secular viewpoints, and Senate Joint Resolution 287 appears to be saying
that religious viewpoints should be treated no differently.
The third way in which Senate Joint Resolution 287 appears to challenge
current law is its provision relating to prayers at meetings of legislative
bodies, such as city councils, county boards of supervisors, and school
boards. The provision allows such bodies to "extend to ministers,
clergypersons, and other individuals the privilege to offer invocations or
other prayers" 117 at their meetings. Upon reading this, one might think this
is yet another provision in the bill that is not needed, because current First
Amendment law already allows legislative bodies to invite persons to offer
prayers at their meeting. This description of the current law, however, is not
entirely accurate. The law does allow persons to pray at meetings of
legislative bodies, but only if the prayers are non-sectarian, which means
they cannot be Christian prayers.
This rule is the result of the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Marsh v.
Chambers,118 which upheld the Nebraska legislature's practice of opening
each session with a prayer offered by a chaplain selected by the legislators
115 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005).
116 S.J. Res. 287, 2013 Va. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013).117 Id.
118 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983).
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and paid with public money. Uncharacteristically, the Court did not decide
the case by applying its established rule of law requiring the government to
be neutral with respect to religion. Instead, it upheld the practice of having
prayers at meetings of the legislature on the grounds that because such
prayers had been offered since the beginning of our nation, it must have
been the case that they were never thought to violate the religion clauses. 119
In its opinion, however, although it did not state that such prayers must be
non-sectarian, the Court spoke approvingly of the fact that the prayers were
non-sectarian and were not used "to roselytize or advance any one, or to
disparage any other, faith or belief." 20 Then in 1989 the Court made its
position clearer; it said, "not even the unique history of legislative prayer
can justify contemporary legislative prayers that have the effect of
affiliating the government with any one specific faith or belief."121 Since
then, various lower federal courts, including the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals whose jurisdiction includes Virginia, have ruled that the religion
122
clauses require that legislative prayers be non-sectarian in nature.
Given the current law's prohibition of government-sponsored sectarian
prayers at meetings of legislative bodies and the failure of Senate Joint
Resolution 287's provision allowing legislative prayers to make it clear that
they must be non-sectarian, it seems only logical to conclude that the
purpose of the provision is to allow sectarian, i.e., Christian, prayers at
meetings of legislative bodies. The fact that Senator Stanley is the attorney
for Pittsylvania County Board of Supervisors in a lawsuit brought against it
by the ACLU to eliminate Christian prayers by invited clergy at its
123
meetings simply reinforces the conclusion that Senate Joint Resolution
119 Id., at 791-92; see generally Lund, supra note 104, at 980-90.
120 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95; see also Lund, supra note 104, 994-97.
121 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (citation omitted).
122 See, e.g., Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 349 (4th Cir. 2011); Wynne v. Town of Great Falls,
376 F.3d 292, 299 (4th Cir. 2004); Mullin v. Sussex Cnty., 861 F.Supp. 2d 411, 426 (D. Del. 2012); cf.
Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263, 1281 (11th Cir. 2008). Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d
20 (2nd Cir. 2012), held that having mostly Christian prayers before a town council constituted an
unconstitutional endorsement of one religion, but it did not require or approve of having only non-
sectarian prayers. It suggested instead that having a diversity of prayers, none of which were endorsed
by the council, would be unconstitutional. Invited prayers at school board meetings have been
disallowed on grounds that school boards are different from legislative bodies. See Doe v. Indian River
Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 290 (3d Cir. 2011); Coles v. Cleveland Bd. Of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 385 (6th
Cir. 1999).
123 See John R. Crane, Judge Sides with ACLU on Pittsylvania Prayer Issue, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Mar. 28, 2013, B8, available at http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/state-regional/judge-
sides-with-aclu-on-pittsylvania-prayer-issue/article-af7bc8lb-dc8d-567f-ae99-470c2e52884b.html. It is
ironic that the Pittsylvania County supervisors want to have Christian prayers at their meetings when
Jesus condemned such prayers as insincere and hypocritical. See Ellis M. West, Prayers at Meetings of
Lawmakers: What Would Jesus Think?, 185 RELIGIOUS HERALD 21 (2012), available at
http://www.religiousherald.org/index.phpoption=com content&task=vie w&id=6154&Itemid=9.
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287 is an attempt to legalize such prayers, even in the face of opposing U.
S. constitutional law.
In response, Senator Stanley might very well say, yes, that is indeed the
purpose of the provision in question and then proceed to defend it. He
might ask, is it possible to distinguish between sectarian and non-sectarian
prayers?124 If the latter are permissible, why should not the former also be
permissible? If the rationale for prohibiting sectarian prayers is that the
government must not identify itself with any one "specific faith or belief' at
the expense of others, why would that rationale also not prohibit non-
sectarian prayers, which, after all, identify the government with religion in
general and thereby disparage non-religious persons? On the other hand, if
non-sectarian prayers are constitutionally justified on the basis of their
long-standing practice, then why should not Christian prayers also be
justified on that basis? 125
Such an argument, however, can also work in reverse and against
Senator Stanley: if sectarian prayers at meetings of legislative bodies are
unacceptable in spite of their historic practice, then why should non-
sectarian prayers be acceptable just because of their historic practice?
Clearly the Supreme Court's principle of neutrality toward religion does not
allow government to discriminate against non-religious persons, whether
they are called atheists, agnostics, or "nones." 6 One might argue,
therefore, that if Senator Stanley were really interested in protecting the
religious freedom of all Virginians, he should submit a bill that would
prohibit all officially sponsored prayers, both sectarian and non-sectarian,
at meetings of legislative bodies. The reason for doing so has been well
explained as follows:
When the government speaks religiously, it becomes committed to making a
continual set of discretionary religious choices. This invites conflict; in the
context of legislative prayer, it means battles over who will have the right to
pray and what they will get to say. Government now must decide fundamental
issues of religious truth-it must decide the proper type of religious message
and the joper type of person to deliver it. . . . [and] someone will have to be
rejected.
124 See generally Lund, supra note 104, at 1001-13 (analyzing the difficulty of distinguishing, both in
theory and practice, between sectarian and non-sectarian prayer).
125 See Lund, supra note 104, at 1022; see, e.g., Steven B. Epstein, Rethinldng the Constitutionality of
Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2083, 2104 (1996) (summarizing the long-standing and
widespread practice of Christian prayers at meetings of legislatures).
126 Lund, supra note 104, at 978, 981-82.
127 Lund, supra note 104, at 978, 1002-04 (explaining that if a government chooses to use the Lord's
Prayer or display the Ten Commandments, it has to decide which version to use or display).
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This last argument, however, assumes that the prayers at meetings of
legislative bodies are governmental in nature. Is that a valid assumption?
This is the crucial issue that the courts have not addressed and yet need to
address - not whether the prayers are sectarian or have been practiced since
the beginning of our country. Given that the Supreme Court has interpreted
the religion clauses as requiring government neutrality toward religion,
these latter issues are irrelevant, but what is clearly relevant is whether such
prayers are government-sponsored or not. Why is this in doubt? Consider
the following: if during a meeting of a legislative body at which citizens
were allowed to speak one of them publically uttered a prayer as part of
her/his remarks, or indeed if an individual legislator publically uttered a
prayer as part of his/her remarks, it is very doubtful if a court would say
that such a prayer violates the religion clauses, for it would appear to be a
case of an individual's expressing her or his own beliefs as opposed to
speaking on behalf of the government.
A body of legislators could also argue that when it invites a clergyperson
to say a prayer, it does so not because it wants to make a statement about
the importance of religion versus non-religion or in any way to influence
the beliefs/practices of those present at the meeting, but rather because its
members want divine guidance on their deliberations and decision-making.
If the legislators were to meet voluntarily and privately for prayer
immediately before the beginning of their public meeting, surely no court
would hold that they could not do that. Is the fact that their prayers are said
at a public meeting enough to transform them from being private (and
allowed) to being governmental (and not allowed by the religion clauses of
the First Amendment)? On the other hand, if lawmakers are truly interested
in praying (or having someone pray) for divine help, why does it need to be
done in public? Their praying in public suggests that what they are most
interested in doing is sending a message to their constituents about the
importance of religion or Christianity (or perhaps about their own
religiosity).
One other possibility would be for the legislative body to create a
designated public forum at some point during its meetings and allow
anyone to speak on any topic that might be germane to the work of the
128body. Then if Christian clergy or laypersons, on their own without being
asked, wanted to say a Christian prayer asking for divine guidance or even
for intervention on behalf of a certain bill, they could do so during the
public forum. Of course, persons of other faiths as well as atheists and
128 See Perry Educ. Ass'nv. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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skeptics would also have the opportunity to "pray" or express their views
on matters. One scholar who has examined such an arrangement concludes
that it would be constitutional, but speculates that it would not be appealing
to most legislative bodies because it would allow and even encourage the
expression of prayers and viewpoints to which they would be opposed.129
This assessment, however, is likely to hold only for areas of the country
that are religiously pluralistic; in the mostly Christian communities in
Southside Virginia this arrangement might be quite appealing.
This, in turn, raises the question of whether a designated public forum
that is officially open to all viewpoints, religious and otherwise, but is
dominated by the viewpoint or expressions of one religion violates the
principle of neutrality dictated by the religion clauses. The Supreme Court
has not ruled on this question, but has implied that such a forum would be
unconstitutional. For example, in Widmar v. Vincent, which allowed student
religious groups along with other student groups to use the facilities of the
University of Missouri, the Court noted approvingly that under that
arrangement there was "a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious
speakers" on campus and no "empirical evidence that religious groups ...
dominate [d]" that forum.130 Certain individual justices have also suggested
that a forum dominated by one religious group should not be allowed.131
To the extent that this position is or might become the law, it, in turn, raises
the difficult question of what constitutes "domination" of a public forum.
Finally, whatever the answer to that question might be, as a way of helping
to ensure that whatever is said is not understood as government endorsed or
sponsored, a government entity such as a legislative body could explicitly
disassociate itself from all expressions in the public forum.
Unfortunately the questions and possibilities just discussed have yet to
be addressed by the Supreme Court, the only court that can do so in a
definitive way. It now, however, has the opportunity to do just that, for the
Court has agreed to review a Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision
striking down the practice of having mostly Christian prayers at the
beginning of town council meetings. Regardless of how the Court will
129 Lund, supra note 104, at 1029-35.
130 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981).
131 See, e.g., Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("At some point, . . . a religious group may so dominate a public forum that a formal policy of equal
access is transformed into a demonstration of approval."). Contra Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 119-
20, n. 9 ( stating that when the government creates a designated forum open to groups of any viewpoint,
the establishment clause would not be violated "simply because only groups presenting a religious
viewpoint have opted to take advantage of the forum at a particular time.").
132 Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2nd Cir. 2012), appeal docketed, No.12-696 (2013).
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rule in that case, amending the Virginia Bill of Rights to allow sectarian
prayers at meetings of lawmakers will have no effect on its decision, and
certainly will not trump a decision disallowing sectarian prayers.
IV. SHOULD PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS HAVE A RIGHT TO BE EXCUSED
FROM ACTIVITIES TO WHICH THEY HAVE RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS?
The final provision in Senate Joint Resolution 287 that deserves analysis
is the one that says that "no student in public schools shall be compelled to
perform or participate in academic assignments or educational presentations
that violate his [or her?] religious beliefs."133 Unlike the previous
provisions analyzed in this article, this provision has some merit and is
worth considering-for three reasons.
First, public school students are sometimes required to take courses that
teach or at least present ideas that conflict with what their religion teaches
them to believe. Examples are biology courses that teach the theory of
evolution and health courses that teach methods of contraception or imply
that pre-marital sex is not immoral. The idea of evolution is especially
objectionable to religious parents and students if it is taught to mean that
the creation of the world and evolution of species are entirely "natural," i.e.,
can in no way be attributed to God or some transcendent source of being.
Taught in that way, it is an "anti-religious" doctrine.135
Second, if it is a problem that needs to be addressed, the law as it
currently stands may not afford enough protection to students who feel that
their religion is being threatened by their having to take certain subjects in
school. For example, the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, both
136
as originally understood and as currently interpreted by the Supreme
Court, does not entail a right of persons to be exempt from obeying
valid, secular laws that conflict with what their religion requires them to do
133 S.J. Res. 287, 2013 Va. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013).
134 See, e.g., George W. Dent, Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 863, 864 (1987-
88). See generally id. (examining the constitutional claims of religious parents and children offended by
public education).
135 Moreover, there are many scientists who argue that science should be taught in that way. See
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH: THE EVIDENCE FOR EVOLUTION 4, 436 (2009)
(arguing that the fear of offending religious students threatens the truthful teaching of science).
136 See Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America: The Case of
Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10 JRNL OF LAW AND RELIGION 367-401 (1993-94);
Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 245-319 (1991); and Philip Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious
Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEORGE WASHINGTON L. REV. 915-48 (1992).
137 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990)
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or not do.138 Although the Court did hold in one case, Wisconsin v. Yoder,
that Amish children have a right to be exempt from a law requiring them to
attend public high schools 13 and that decision has not been overruled, it
140
relied heavily on considerations peculiar to Amish faith and life, and it
has not been used to justify the kind of religion-based exemption called for
141in Senate Joint Resolution 287. Moreover, the most important lower
federal court decision that did address this issue ruled against the parents
who for religious reasons did not want their elementary school children to
be exposed to certain literature that they considered to be anti-religious, and
142the Supreme Court declined to hear it on appeal. Because of this decision
and subsequent one in lower federal courts, current law suggests that
parents who object on religious grounds to the contents of the curriculum or
to assignments will not be able to obtain exemptions for their children on
the basis of the free exercise clause.143
Third, the provision in Senate Joint Resolution 287 intended to protect
the religious faith of students is not objectionable on the grounds that it
violates the establishment clause as interpreted by the Court. Although one
could argue that religion-based exemptions from valid, secular laws do
violate that clause and its requirement of government neutrality toward and
equal treatment of all religions and persons regardless of their religion or
144lack thereof, the Court has never taken such a position. To the contrary,
it has said that although such exemptions are not required by the free
exercise clause, they may be granted by legislative bodies without violating
the establishment clause, and it has upheld certain ones of them.14 5
138 See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 537-39 (1st Cir. 1995) (dismissing
plaintiffs' claim under the Free Exercise Clause that a mandatory school assembly "imping[ed] on their
sincerely held religious values regarding chastity and morality").
139 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972).
140 Id. at 235-36.
141 See, e.g., Eric A. DeGroff, Parental Rights and Public School Curricula: Revisiting Mozert after 20
Years, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 83, 105 (2009) ("In light of the decisions described above [including Wisconsin
v. Yoder and subsequent lower court decisions], the state of the law concerning both the nature and
scope of parental rights remains largely unclear.... Further guidance from the Supreme Court would
bring much-needed clarity.").
142 Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987); Mozert v. Hawkins
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
143 DeGroff, supra note 140, at 88-94; see also THOMAS C. BERG, THE STATE AND RELIGION 195-96
(2nd ed. 2004).
144 See Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special? Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U.PITT L. Rev. 75, 77 (1990); Ira C. Lupu,
Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accomodation of Religion,
140 U.PA. L.REV. 555, 556 (1991); Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 743, 749-754 (1992).
145 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-20
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To conclude from this, however, that the Virginia Bill of Rights needs to
be amended in order to protect the religious liberty of students would be
premature, for the preceding analysis is based solely on the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the religion clauses of the First Amendment; it
fails to take into account Virginia law. When that is taken into account, it
becomes less clear that the provision in question is needed-for two
reasons. First, Virginia already has a law that allows students, for religious
reasons, to be exempt from having to attend any school, public or private,
to be home-schooled, or to be educated in any way . It says, "A school
board shall excuse from attendance at school: 1. Any pupil who, together
with his parents, by reason of bona fide religious training or belief is
conscientiously opposed to attendance at school."146 In fact, Virginia is the
147
only state in the nation with such a law. The vast majority of states
148(forty-six) do not provide religion-based exemptions from compulsory
attendance laws, but do allow parents who are opposed to sending their
children to public schools to send them to private schools or to home-school
them. The three other states that do provide religion-based exemptions
require that the exempted children receive some kind of education.149
Regarding the Virginia law, one study says, ". . . when it comes to religious
[sic] exemptions from public school attendance, Virginia is unusually
permissive and deferential to the views of parents seeking exemptions, and,
at least by the terms of the statute, uniquely unconcerned about the
educational futures of those children receiving religious [sic]
- ,150
exemptions."
The existence of this statute, however, does not necessarily mean that it
authorizes religion-based exemptions from specific courses, sections of
courses, or other "academic assignments or educational presentations.",151 It
appears to have been written with attendance in general in mind, but given
its actual wording, it could certainly be interpreted and used to allow
absences from specific, limited parts of a school's educational program.
Why, therefore, amend the Virginia Bill of Rights until this existing law has
(2005); Arlan's Dep't Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962) (dismissing an appeal of Kentucky retail
store owners convicted under a Kentucky law forbidding operation of stores on Sunday); cf. Texas
Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 2 (1989).
146 VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254(B)(1) (1950).
147 Christine Tschiderer et al., 7,000 Children and Counting: An Analysis of Religious Exemptions from
Compulsory School Attendance in Virginia, CHILD ADVOCACY CLINIC OF UNIV. OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL
OF LAw 10 (2012), available at, http://www.law.virginia.edulpdf/news/religious-exemption report.pdf.
148 Id. at 11.
149 Id. at 10.
150 Id.
151 S.J. Res. 287, 2013 Va. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013).
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been tried as the means of obtaining relief to students religiously opposed to
certain aspects of their public school education?
Even if Virginia's law granting religion-based exemptions from
attendance at school would for some reason not work to exempt students
from participating in specific assignments or presentations, there is yet
another Virginia law that probably would-at least some of the time. It is
entitled "Religious freedom preserved . . ." and includes the following
provision: "No government entity shall substantially burden a person's free
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person is (i) essential to further a compelling governmental interest and (ii)
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest."152 On its face, this provision could certainly be used to protect
students from some educational material or assignments to which they had
religious objections.
There is, however, one important difference between this provision and
the one in Senate Joint Resolution 287. The latter provides automatic
exemptions from objectionable assignments or presentations; under the
amendment all a student has to do to obtain an exemption is to assert,
presumably sincerely, that a particular assignment or presentation violates
his/her religious beliefs. No matter how important educationally the
assignment or presentation or how insubstantial the threat to her or his
beliefs might be, a student could, on the basis of this provision, obtain an
exemption. In contrast, the law entitled "Religious freedom preserved" does
not authorize automatic exemptions. To obtain one, students have to show
that without it their exercise of religion would be substantially burdened
and that the requirement from which they sought an exemption was not the
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.153
Whether they could do that would vary from situation to situation. For
example, it would probably be much more difficult to obtain a religion-
based exemption from being exposed to the facts about sexual intercourse
and contraceptives than it would be to obtain one from a biology course in
which creation, life, and evolution are taught as being entirely and
necessarily "Godless."
Which of these two provisions would be the best way of protecting the
religious liberty of public school students? The former has the advantage of
being easy to administer, but the disadvantage of allowing exemptions for
152 VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.02(B) (1950).
153 Id.
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frivolous reasons. The latter has the advantage of already being a law, and it
prevents frivolous claims. Its disadvantage is that it is difficult to
administer. It could lead to an "endless" number of court cases in which
judges, perhaps arbitrarily, decide whether the threat to religious freedom
154
outweighs the benefits of the educational activity. In any case, how one
answers the preceding question will likely determine whether she or he
thinks the provision in Senate Joint Resolution 287 to provide religion-
based exemptions to public school students is needed.
V. CONCLUSION.
Senate Joint Resolution 287 is a proposed addition to the historic Section
16 of the Virginia Bill of Rights. Its proponents say that it is needed to
protect the religious freedom of the citizens of the Commonwealth of
155Virginia, which implies that Section 16 does not adequately do that, even
though it has been "on the books" for over two hundred years and
universally admired for the protection it has afforded religious freedom. 156
This article has examined and analyzed all of the substantive provisions
of Senate Joint Resolution 287. It has done so on the basis of three criteria:
whether the provisions are clearly and concisely worded, whether they are
needed to protect religious freedom, and whether they are consistent with
the religion clauses of the First Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme
Court and other federal courts. Hopefully, it has shown that Senate Joint
Resolution 287 is so poorly worded that it is confusing and, if adopted, will
be difficult to interpret and apply; that with one possible exception (the
provision intended to protect students from objectionable educational
assignments), the provisions are not needed to protect the religious freedom
of non-governmental agents (individuals or groups); and that at least three
of the provisions are intended or could be interpreted as intending to justify
and encourage violations of the religion clauses of the First Amendment.
In regard to this last point, the crux of the problem is that Senate Joint
Resolution 287 fails to accept and observe the distinction between non-
governmental (private) and governmental (public) religious expression and
the rule that the latter is forbidden by the religion clauses. Although it is
sometimes difficult to know under which category a particular religious
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expression falls, and mistakes in that regard may have been made, that is
hardly a reason to reject the rule that the government should not pass laws
or take actions that have as their primary purpose or effect the advancing or
harming of religion, any particular religion, or any person/group because of
his/her/its religion.15 7
Given these conclusions, the question necessarily arises: why would
anyone propose or vote for a law, whether a constitutional amendment or
statute, most of whose provisions are unnecessary and some of which are
very likely to be declared in violation of the First Amendment of the U. S.
Constitution? One possible answer is that the proponents of Senate Joint
Resolution 287 may believe that, if adopted, when its provisions are struck
down by lower federal courts, the Supreme Court will be willing to hear
them on appeal, will then modify its current interpretation of the religion
clauses, and will hold that Senate Joint Resolution 287's provisions are
constitutional. That such a strategy, and justification for proposing and
adopting Senate Joint Resolution 287, is not all that far-fetched or
unrealistic is suggested by the fact that a similar strategy appears to
underway as a means of getting Roe v. Wade overturned. Of course,
there are far fewer reasons for thinking that the Court will reverse or even
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modify such decisions as Abington School District v. Schempp than there
are for thinking that it will overturn Roe v. Wade.
The more likely explanation for Senate Joint Resolution 287 is simply
politics. These days it is often said by observers of and commentators on
lawmaking in this country that legislators now take actions and make
decisions much more on the basis of how they will affect their individual or
their party's chances for success at the polls than on the basis of whether
they will be in the best interest of the people or are consistent with the
161Constitution, state or federal. If this thesis is applicable to Senate Joint
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Resolution 287, it would mean that its supporters have championed it not
necessarily because they actually agree with its provisions or believe it has
a decent chance of being accepted either by the General Assembly or the
courts, but because doing so will garner them and their party campaign
contributions and votes come election time. In some sections of the
Commonwealth a majority of the citizens has probably not yet accepted the
fact that school-sponsored prayer and Bible-reading cannot take place
within the public schools or that boards of supervisors and school boards
cannot begin their meetings with Christian prayers. From a political
perspective, therefore, it would make perfectly good sense for
representatives or would-be representatives from those sections to take
positions on such issues that are consistent with those of their constituents.
Hopefully, in next year's Virginia General Assembly, when Senate Joint
Resolution 287 is likely to be considered again, the number of
representatives from areas of the Commonwealth who object to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment will be far less than
the number of representatives from areas whose citizens approve of it and
believe, as did Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, that religious
freedom depends on separating religion from government.
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